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Correspondences and Contradictions 
in International and Domestic Conflict 
Resolution: Lessons from General 
Theory and Varied Contexts 
Carrie Menke/-Meadow· 
I. INTRODUCTION: Is GENERAL THEORY POSSIBLE? 
Does the field of conflict resolution have any broadly applicable theories that 
"work" across the different domains of international and domestic conflict? Or, 
are contexts, participants, and resources so "domain" specific and variable that 
only "thick descriptions" of particular contexts will do? These are important 
questions which have been plaguing me in this depressing time for conflict resolu-
tion professionals, from September 11,2001 (9/11), to the war against Iraq. Have 
we learned anything about conflict resolution that really does improve our ability 
to describe, predict, and act to reduce unnecessary and harmful conflict? These 
are the questions I want to explore in this essay, all the while knowing that I will 
ask more questions than I have answers to. My hope is to spark more rigorous 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University, and Director, Georgetown-Hewlett Program in Con-
flict Resolution and Legal Problem Solving. Thanks especially to my c'olleague and friend Jean 
Stern light for her invitation, hospitality, and intellectual stimulation. Thanks to the remarkable pro-
gram of Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri-Columbia for its interest, faculty, students, 
and on-going production of new knowledge and practice. Some of these thoughts were sparked by my 
participation in the 2002 Hewlett Conference on "Practice to Theory" in New York in March 2002, 
which focused on conflict theory and practice in hostage settings, international disputes and conflicts, 
community and church conflicts and approaches to conflict resolution, and the events of September II, 
200 I. For some of the thoughts that stimulated me there, see the special issue of NEGOTIATION 
JOURNAL devoted to the conference. vol. 18, No.4 2002, edited by Sandra Cheldelin, Melanie Green-
berg, Christopher Honeyman, and Maria R. Volpe. Thanks to my wonderful colleagues in the Culture 
and Conflict Resolution Group in Washington D.C. (Kevin Avruch, Carol Izumi, Melanie Greenberg, 
Howard Gadlin, Christopher Honeyman, Homer LaRue, Donna Stienstra, and Wally Warfield) whose 
conversations on these and other topics in the last few years has deeply enlightened and engaged me. 
And finally, thanks to a variety of my international and comparative law colleagues at Georgetown 
who have permitted my "transboundary" (and somewhat amateur) incursion into their field as I travel 
the actual globe with intellectual and practical exports, with, I hope, the right amount of wonder and 
humility. 
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attention to the possibility of "comparative dispute resolution" study and practice, 
using key concepts, theories, empirical studies, practical wisdom, and experiential 
insights to spark and encourage more "multi-level" and multi-unit analysis of 
some of our "shared" propositions. 
I begin with some skepticism that our efforts to create a "general" theory of 
conflict resolution across widely different domains is in fact possible, although I 
have tried to define it and explain it myself. I Perhaps it is the condition of the 
world at the present moment, teetering at the edge of a fragility unknown to even 
the survivors of the Cold War and World War II, due to the unpredictable, non-
nation state possibilities of "viral" conflicts and "wars." Or, perhaps it is my so-
ciological bent to see the "varieties" in human behavior and the "conditions" of 
human situations, rather than the "grand meta-theories" of some forms of social 
theory and science, but I think that at present, our field of conflict resolution has 
little in the way of generalizable propositions that work (explain, describe, predict, 
and prescribe) across all domains. 
I do not mean that we have no accumulated learning or "mid-level" theories 
or organizing frameworks to structure our knowledge bases and facilitate our 
"practical reasoning" (for those of us who are practitioners, as well as theorists, 
researchers, and teachers). I will review some of that "propositional knowledge" 
here (and others have also done creditable syntheses of what we know already)/ 
I. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (2001); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD (Herbert Kritzer ed., 2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, in OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW (Kermit Hall ed., 2002); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Conflict Resolution, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNITY (2003); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Conflict Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNITY (2003). 
2. See KEVIN A VRUCH, CULTURE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1998) [hereinafter A VRUCH, 
CULTURE); BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Morton Deutsch, 
Cooperation and Conflict: A Personal Perspective on the History of the Social Psychological Study of 
Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL TEAMWORK AND COOPERATIVE 
THINKING (M.A. West et al. cds., 2003) [hereinafter Deutsch, Cooperation and Conflict); THE 
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Cole-
man eds. 2000) [hereinafter THE HANDBOOK); MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: 
CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES (1973); ROGER FISHER, ET AL., COPING WITH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A SYSTEMATIC ApPROACH TO INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATION (1997); FRED. C. IKLE, How NATIONS NEGOTIATE (1964); INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATION: ANALYSIS, ApPROACHES, ISSUES (Victor A. Kremnyuk ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION); LOUIS KRIESBERG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS: FROM ESCALATION 
TO RESOLUTIONS, (2d ed. 2002); HUGH MIALL ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE 
PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF DEADLY CONFLICTS (1999); DEAN PRUITT ET 
AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE AND SETTLEMENT (1986); HOWARD RAIFFA ET AL., 
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING (2002); 
JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERTRAM BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND 
NEGOTIATION (1975); STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEFFREY Z. 
RUBIN (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002) [hereinafter STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION); MICHAEL 
WATKINS & SUSAN ROSEGRANT, BREAKTHROUGH INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: How GREAT 
NEGOTIATIONS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD'S TOUGHEST POST-COLD WAR CONFLICTS (2001); Kevin 
Avruch, Type I and Type" Errors in Culturally Sensitive Conflict Resolution Practice, 20 CONFLICT 
RESOL. Q. 351 (2003). This is a very partial bibliography of some of the scholarly works which have 
attempted field synthesis. Any reader will be struck with the relative lack of inter-penetration of fields, 
that is mutual citations from domestic (United States) negotiation and conflict resolution, and interna-
tional relations treatments of conflict resolution. Some of this is changing with funding (Hewlett 
Foundation and other initiatives), practice (Search for Common Ground's new domestic initiatives, at 
http//:www. sfcg.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2003), and a newer generation of scholars who are working 
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but I want to explore some of the divergences of domestic conflict resolution from 
international conflict resolution studies and suggest that we might profitably learn 
by studying contrasts, exposing level or unit errors of generalization and analysis, 
rather than hoping we will uncover or describe "deep structures" that will inform 
our work at all levels of conflict. While there are some very interesting analogies, 
metaphors, classifications, taxonomies, and occasionally, even a "concept,,3 that 
work across levels and domains, I suggest here that those occasions may be rarer 
than we think and often may be misleading. I prefer the "thick description'>'! of 
sociology and anthropology that tells us that context may matter a great deal, as 
does the history, culture, personality, situations, geography, economics, and poli-
tics that construct those contexts.s While we in the field of conflict resolution 
have been pushing hard to learn lessons from our case studies so that we can ask 
"how is the Mideast crisis like Northern Ireland?" or "what do disputes between 
different ethnic and racial groups in the United States teach us about possible 
peaceful co-existence in other multi-ethnic nation-states?," I have come to think 
that we may be better off asking "how is Northern Ireland different from the 
Mideast crisis?" and "what makes each multi-ethnic nation-state different in its 
in both fields. How many younger students of our field know that the book ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM 
URY, GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed., Penguin Books 1991) (1981) was inspired by 
Fisher's earlier work in international conflict, ROGER FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR 
BEGINNERS (1969), not by domestic legal disputes? This failure to read, learn, and cite outside the 
boundaries of our limited fields has been lamented in the "theory-practice" divide, in the "legal" vs. 
"other professions" division in domestic conflict resolution (or "A DR") and in the division between 
trade (private) negotiations and diplomatic and human rights (public) negotiations in the international 
field. 
3. As explored more fully in the text, notions of "ripeness," "deadlines," and "shape of the table" 
(participating parties), "dual-track negotiations" (public and private, caucus and no-caucus or "shuttle 
diplomacy"), and "relationship building" (from familial to international relations) have transcended 
domains and have served useful explanatory and prescriptive functions across domains. 
4. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983). 
S. There is a growing literature, both in anthologies and book-length treatments, of richly described 
case studies of conflict resolution "stories," told both to "thickly describe" those contexts and to at-
tempt to elucidate "patterns" or teachings for generalizable descriptions, predictions, and prescriptions 
for the field. I like to call these "peace stories." See PETER ACKERMAN & JACK DUVALL, A FORCE 
MORE POWERFUL: A CENTURY OF NON-VIOLENT CONFLICT (2000); LAWRENCE BACOW & MICHAEL 
WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984); GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (1986); THE CONSENSUS BUILDING 
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 
1999) [hereinafter THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK]; THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN 
SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd. eds., 1978); FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION: 
RELIGION, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (Raymond G. Helmick et al. eds., 200 I); 
HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD (Chester Crocker et al. eds., 1999); 
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (1993); 
SUSAN COLLIN MARKS, WATCHING THE WIND: CONFLICT RESOLUTION DURING SOUTH AFRICA'S 
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2000); MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: MULTIPLE 
ApPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (Jacob Berkovitch & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1992); GEORGE 
J. MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE (1999); RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF MEDIATION (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996); CARMEN SIRIANI & LEWIS FRIEDLAND, CIVIC 
INNOVATION IN AMERICA: COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE MOVEMENT FOR 
CIVIC RENEWAL (2001); TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT (Chester Crocker et al. eds., 200 I) [hereinafter TURBULENT PEACE]; WORDS OVER WAR: 
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT (Melanie Greenberg et al. eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter WORDS OVER WAR]; see also Robert Malley & Hussein Agha, Camp David: The Tragedy 
o/Errors, 48 NEW YORK REV. BOOKS S9 (2001). 
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approaches to 'dealing with diversity?'" What is the significance of "difference" 
that may illuminate what we can know about conflict resolution across different 
domains? To explore that question in a reasonable time and space here, I will 
limit myself to a few propositional examples of conflict resolution "knowledge": 
I. Structures of conflicts and conflict resolution; 
2. Processes of conflicts and conflict resolution; 
3. Concepts in conflict resolution (such as "deadlines," "ripeness," 
"needs and interests," and "relationships"); 
4. People in conflict (their motivations, choices, socialization, and vari-
ability); and finally, 
5. Alternatives to conflict or conflict resolution. 
My hope is to set an agenda for a richer exploration of "comparative dispute 
resolution." Like the questioning academic and practitioner that I am, I remain 
somewhat skeptical, or at least agnostic, about whether those of us who are "con-
flict resolution professionals" can ply our trades, whether theoretical, empirical, or 
practical, across all domains simultaneously. 
I focus here on three aspects of conflict resolution across domains: 
I. The development of a relatively well-developed, if contested, body of 
knowledge about the theory and practice of conflict resolution in the 
American "domestic" sphere, notably, negotiation,6 mediation,? and other 
forms of "ADR" interventions in legal, community, environmental, 
commercial, family, public policy, and other kinds of disputes or con-
flicts· 8 , 
6. See MAX BAZERMAN & MARGARET NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY (1992); FISHER & URY, 
supra note 2; DAVID LAX & JAMES SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR (1986); ROBERT 
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 
(2000); RAIFFA, supra note 2; WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MARGARET BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL 
NEGOTIATOR (1982); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another 
View]. 
7. See ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994); 
KIMBERLEE KOVACH, MEDIATION (2003); CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS (3d ed. 
2003); Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations. Strategies and Techniques, 1 HARV. 
NEG. REV. 7 (1996). 
8. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & JEAN STERNLIGHT, 
ApPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL FOR DISPUTE PROCESSING, 
LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (forthcoming 2004); CARRIE MENKEL-
MEADOW, DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY 
(2003); JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 
2002). 
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2. The relationship of international relations theorl and conflict resolu-
tion theory, research and practice in diplomatic, nation-state, human 
rights, and other "public" conflicts,1O and trade, II business, and "private" 
conflict resolution; 12 and, 
3. The highly contested "exportation" of American-style dispute resolu-
tion to both the international arena and to national or "domestic" nations, 
systems, or cultures outside of the United States. 13 
II. THREE TRUE STORIES 
A. Culture Matters 
323 
Like many dispute resolution professionals, I began to be asked in the mid-
1980s to "go abroad" and teach "negotiation," "mediation," or "conflict resolu-
tion" in a wide variety of other countries, with widely different "needs and inter-
ests." In some cases the invitations came from lawyers who just wanted some of 
the new American "skills training" in negotiation in traditional legal matters; in 
other cases, innovative legal educators were interested in developing experiential 
learning and clinical programs; in other cases, the focus was on developing insti-
tutions alternative to governmental structures (because of corruption or distrust in 
the conventional institutions, or for desires to develop innovative and alternative 
9. See BENEDICT ANDERSON. IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1991); TED ROBERT GURR, PEOPLES 
VERSUS STATES: MINORITIES AT RISK IN THE NEW CENTURY (2000); DONALD HOROWITZ, ETHNIC 
GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 
(1969); INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 
(Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986); STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES (1987); KENNETH N. 
WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). 
10. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CONFLICT (1994). 
See also Fen Osler Hampson, Parent. Midwife or Accidental Executioner? The Role of Third Parties in 
Ending Violent Conflict, in TURBULENT PEACE, supra note 5; Louis Kriesberg, "The Growth of the 
Conflict Resolution Field," in TURBULENT PEACE, supra note 5; Saadia Touval & I. William Zartman, 
"International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era," in TURBULENT PEACE, supra note 5; see sources 
cited supra note 5. 
II. See JOHN JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND WTO (2001); Andrea Kupfer Schnei-
der, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organiza-
tions, 20 MICH. J.INT'L L. 697 (1999). 
12. See JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY (2001); DEAN ALLEN FOSTER, BARGAINING 
ACROSS BORDERS (1992); JESWALD SA LAC USE, MAKING GLOBAL DEALS (1991). 
13. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD (1999); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. 
GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE (1996); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE (1995); Raymond 
Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures, in TURBULENT PEACE, supra note 5; Laura Nader & Elisabetta 
Grande, Current Illusions and Delusions about Conflict Management - In Africa and Elsewhere, 27 
LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 573 (2002) [hereinafter Nader, Current Illusions and Delusions]; Elizabeth 
Mertz, Introduction to From the Trenches and Towers: Current Illusions and Delusions About Conflict 
Management in Africa and Elsewhere, 27 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 567 (2002). See also Staff Reporters, 
State Department Seeks Proposals to Promote ADR Overseas, ADRWORLD.COM, July 18, 2002, at 
hUp://adIWorld.com (suggesting different uses of arbitration, mediation, and negotiation in different 
regions of the world, and requesting proposals for training and exchange programs); Symposium, 
Export/Import: American Civil Justice in a Global Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 253-675 (2002); 
Department of State Notice 4064, 67 Fed. Reg. 46008 (July II, 2002) (requesting grant proposals for 
"cooperative international projects to introduce American and Foreign participants to each other's 
social, economic, and political structures). 
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structures, even where there was no caseload delay problem); in yet other cases, 
the needs were more urgent, seeking effective ways to solve intractable problems 
(of human co-existence, of environmental harm, or scarce resource allocation). I 
resisted many of these invitations to interesting and exotic places, not because I 
don't like to travel (I do), but because as a sociologically trained lawyer, I was 
exquisitely sensitive to what I thought were the cultural determinants and variants 
of how and why particular processes might work in particular places and institu-
tions and I was reluctant to assume that American-style "problem-solving negotia-
tion" or the ethnocentric "mediative talking cure,,14 would work in other places. 
After some years of giving academic papers and talks, but not doing "trainings," I 
was persuaded to do some negotiation and mediation training in two places I 
thought "closest" to American culture, a Scandinavian countryl5 and the United 
Kingdom. Training programs in negotiation and mediation are participatory, ex-
periential, and call for role-playing and demonstrations of activities-in short, 
active and "public" learning. In the late 1980s and early I 990s, just before much 
of this material we study and the practices we use actually caught on, I found both 
sets of lawyers quite traditional, reticent, and fearful of American-style "informal-
ity." Everyone was very polite, and while both nations have, in fact, heartedly 
endorsed many of these processes,16 there was a definite and formal chill in the air 
(different from the loud and brash hostility of American lawyers who would resist 
negotiation, mediation, and ADR training because they thought I wanted to "kill 
the lawyers,,).17 European lawyers liked their formality, notarized documents, and 
expertise which hierarchically separated them from clients needing their help. As 
strange as our practices of formal discovery might be, openly "sharing," not only 
facts, but "feelings," "interests," and "needs" did not go over well in those earlier 
days in traditional legal settings. 
Fast forward a decade or more, when after some forays into "informal" Aus-
tralia, mediation-experienced Japan (in a different way, of course),18 and our imi-
tative sister up north (Canada),19 all with greater success, I began to teach negotia-
14. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, 
Ideologies, Practices and Paradigms, II NEGOTIATION J. 217 (1995). 
15. Which shall go nameless here-you should hear the nationalist jokes the Scans tell on each other . 
. . even Garrison Keillor might be offended. See GARRISON KEILLOR, A PRAIRIE HOME COMPANION 
PRETTY GOOD JOKE BOOK at 140-52 (2000). Do we need some conflict resolution jokes to get us 
through these trying times? 
16. I was quite active in England during the drafting of the Woolf Report on Civil Justice Reform 
which requires some forms of dispute resolution and gives management control of cases to judges in a 
mixture of American and European styles of adjudication. See Lord Woolf, Access to Jllstice-Interim 
Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Jllstice System in England and Wales (June 1995), at 
http://www.lcd.gov.uk/civillinterfr.htm; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Flltllre(.~) of Civil Liti-
gation: Dream or Nightmare: Lessons from the American Experience, in SHAPING THE FUTURE: 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES (Roger Smith ed., 1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Will Man-
aged Care Give Us Access to Jllstice?, in ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE (Roger Smith ed., (996). 
17. A complaint I actually received in a mediation training program for family lawyers in Los Ange-
les in the mid-1980s. 
18. See Taimie L. Bryant, Family Models, Family Displlte Resoilition and Family Law in Japan, 14 
UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. I (1995). 
19. I have taught in Canada a great deal, at the University of Toronto, Osgoode Hall, University of 
British Columbia, Victoria, etc. I am formally on the faculty of Osgoode's LL.M. program in ADR, 
which actually pre-dated any formal graduate law programs in ADR in the United States. So, some-
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tion, mediation, and ADR in South America (in among other places, the land 
where there are more psychiatrists per capita than here-Argentina!). Instead of 
reticence, I was met with great enthusiasm as lawyers, clients, government offi-
cials, diplomats, and others more willingly embraced both informality (even in 
highly bureaucratic cultures and legal systems) and the "talking cure." Indeed, 
everyone was talking so fast, my weak Spanish skills were soon left behind as the 
skilled simultaneous translators I worked with tried to find appropriate words for 
our American concepts.20 
I don't want to be what I have come here to criticize, a cultural stereotyper 
who oversimplifies or homogenizes cultures, whether national, governmental, or 
professional, but some "cultures" do assimilate and use this "conflict resolution 
technology" better than others. Time, of course, had moved on, bringing with it, 
regional trading groups like NAFTA, the EU, and Mercosur (forcing some inter-
penetration of legal cultures just to do business), but my experience in South 
America was different from that in Europe and is quite different from that of the 
early pioneers who went to Russia and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall,21 or to some other countries with totally corrupt legal systems (some places 
I won't name here, in our own hemisphere). 
What lessons have we learned? Culture matters. "Talking" cultures like Ar-
gentina, Paraguay, and other Latin American cultures, closer to us culturally and 
demographically, as well as geographically and geologically, than our own so-
called "motherland," the UK, may, in some circumstances, be more amenable to 
"exportation" and assimilation of our forms of dispute resolution than some other 
places, including those whose legal systems appear closer to our own (common 
law vs. civil law). Of course, different cultures and legal systems will adapt and 
use our structures and processes to meet their own needs, so there may be both 
adaptation and "deformation" of our exports, a subject I'll return to below. But, it 
is wrong, in my view, to say that we can easily export American-style ADR any-
where, and equally wrong to say that it is always wrong and imperialistic to do 
SO.z2 Exportation of ADR techniques and theories must be culturally and politi-
cally sensitive to the host nations or cultures and recognize that ADR, like Ameri-
can-style democracy,23 Constitutionalism, or litigation can be abused,24 corrupted, 
times we have to imitate too. There are now several LL.M. programs in the United States, including at 
the University of Missouri-Columbia and Georgetown University. 
20. Nothing dramatizes "intercultural work" more than working with translators (in my case from 
several different Spanish-speaking countries) as they try to capture the nuances and colloquial expres-
sions of concepts slightly different from or "alien" to their own varied cultures. For example, in trans-
lating some of the standard video tapes I use (CPR's business mediation tape, Prosando vs. High Tech 
or the Center for Mediation in Law's Saving the Last Dance: Mediation through Understanding 
(intellectual property and employment)), highly technical and "emotional" terms of art, like "caucus-
ing," "looping," and "reframing" may be difficult to capture, even with (or perhaps especially with) 
translators who are certified "legal or diplomatic translators." 
21. See Emily Stewart Haynes, Mediation as an Alternative to Emerging Post-Socialist Legal Insti-
tutions in Central and Eastern Europe, 14 OHIO ST. 1. ON DISP. RESOL. 257 (1997); Kathryn Hendley, 
The Spillover Effects of Privatization in Russian Legal Culture, 5 TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONT. POLS. 39 
(1995); Raymond Shonholtz, Conflict Management Training: A Transformative Vehicle for Transi-
tional Democracies, 2 INT'L NEG. J. 21 (1997). 
22. See Nader, Currellllllusions and Delusions, supra note 13. 
23. See CAROTHERS, supra note \3 (evaluating the success of our "democratization" projects 
abroad). See also Cynthia Alkon, "The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under 
Post-Communist Democratization Programs, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 327; Christopher Honeyman & 
HeinOnline -- 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 326 2003
326 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2003 
or transfonned when it is "transplanted." On a more optimistic note, it may also 
be that totally new or unfamiliar systems, like some forms of American mediation 
or arbitration, may actually tum out to be the lingua franca or new "common de-
nominator" in regional systems of trade or diplomacy when there is distrust or 
lack of knowledge of differing legal traditions, just as international arbitration has 
been used to avoid or transcend the complexities of internationallitigation.25 
B. "When Will They Ever Learn?": Does Theory Inform or Explain the 
Modern World? 
Now that I teach, practice, and study abroad, I have joined the international 
cadre of conflict resolution professionals teaching, training, and even mediating 
and arbitrating in many other locations. As the international scholar, teacher, and 
practitioner that I have somewhat reluctantly become, I have immersed myself in 
international relations theory and its own intellectual disputes as well as read 
countless case studies of the work of our brothers and sisters who have always 
been international conflict resolution professionals (whether by fonnal training or 
governmental authority, such as Henry Kissinger, Jimmy Carter, George Mitchell, 
and Dennis Ross-all skilled conflict resolution interveners with little or no for-
mal training in the mediation and negotiation skills we rigorously teach our stu-
dents). To read from recently published reports of the "successes" of Camp 
David, the Oslo channel, the Dayton Accords, and, most depressingly, the "suc-
cessful" North Korean nuclear proliferation negotiations of 1993-1995,26 is to 
realize how unstable and how resistant to generalizations these "successes" have 
been. Even with the full power and insights of academic and diplomatic "intelli-
gence," as well as our decades of experience in complex bi-lateral and multi-
lateral situations, so many of our "trouble spots" are ready to explode again-
perhaps with far more deadly force or animosity than ever before. And of course, 
there is 9/11 and the "clash of civilizations,,27 that has replaced the schism of the 
Cold War with a more insidious and largely undefined polarity of the "axis of 
evil" versus an unidentified whom-us, the good Allies? And just who are our 
allies now anyway? Clearly, even with all of the teaching and learning of conflict 
resolution, negotiation theory, structural vs. "international society" schools, and 
Sandra Cheldelin, "Have Gavel, Will Travel: Dispute Resolution's Innocents Abroad," CONVENOR 
NEWSLETTER, (Convenor Conflict Resolution, Madison, Wis.), available at, 
http://www.convenor.comlmadison/gavel.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003); Symposium, The Ameri-
canization of International Dispute Resolution, OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2003). 
24. In systems where there are corrupt judicial systems, ADR, or the use of mediation or arbitration, 
is not likely to be a corrective. If judges can be bribed (or killed, as in Colombia), then private arbitra-
tors or mediators are much easier to "control," both by those with power, whether legitimate or not, 
and money. Cj Thomas J. Moyer & Emily Stewart Haynes, Mediation As a Catalyst for Judicial 
Reform in Latin America, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIS? RES. 619 (2003). 
25. See. e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFIELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (2d ed. 
2002). 
26. See Rock Tang, "The North Korea Nuclear Proliferation Crisis," in WORDS OVER WAR, supra 
note 5; WATKINS & ROSEGRANT, supra note 2. 
27. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (2003); CULTURE MATTERS: How HUMAN VALUES SHAPE 
HUMAN PROGRESS (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000); THOMAS L. 
FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (1999); SAMUEL 
HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS (1996). 
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post-Cold War cosmopolitanism28 or "the end of history,,,29 we are no closer to 
world peace than we ever were, and perhaps we are a good deal more distant from 
it. It is a depressing time to be in conflict resolution. How ephemeral are our 
"successes"; how quickly scuttled are decades worth of detente and understanding 
only to be undermined by "networks" of "crazies, crusaders, or criminals,,3o or 
more predictably, "regime changes," whether by election or by force! 
What lessons have we learned? None, I fear. To quote from two of my fa-
vorite songs of the Sixties: "Yes, and how many deaths will it take/ till he knows/ 
that too many people have died?,,31 "When will they ever learn,! when will they 
ever learn?,,32 I do wonder if we have "learned" anything in international diplo-
matic activity, derived from all of the "flowering" of theory and practice in con-
flict resolution in the last two or three decades. How do leaders, ~olicy makers, 
and diplomats learn and use, if at all, the teachings of our field? 3 And, more 
depressingly and dramatically, what assumptions of rationality, world views, and 
desired ends-"peaceful co-existence," survival, democracy, and capitalism34-do 
our theories make? Can we have a theory to use when dealing with those who do 
not share the assumptions on which our theories are constructed?35 
C. Context is Everything: We Cannot Over-Generalize 
Last spring, I moderated a session at a conference on "'Practice to Theory' in 
Conflict Resolution,,36 involving several skilled law enforcement experts in nego-
tiating with hostages, in primarily domestic-urban settings. The theory of the 
conference planners was that we would learn from the practitioners in extreme 
negotiation situations about what theory informed their practice and what lessons 
from negotiation "in extremis" might serve us in more "ordinary" settings (like 
simple and complex lawsuits). I learned several things from that interaction: first, 
28. IGNATIEFF, supra note 5; MICHEAL WALZER, ON TOLERATION (1997). 
29. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," THE NAT'L INT., 1989, at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/fukuyama.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 
2003). 
30. See Jack Cambria et aI., Negotiation Under Extreme Pressure: The "Mouth Marines" and the 
Hostage Takers, 18 NEGOTIATION J. 331 (2002). 
31. BOB DYLAN, Blowin in the Wind, on THE FREEWHEELlN' BOB DYLAN (Columbia Records 1963). 
32. PETER, PAUL & MARY, Where Have All The Flowers Gone?, on PETER, PAUL & MARY (Sanga 
Music Inc.-BMI 1962). 
33. Like many of us, as a student of conflict resolution, I start each day by scanning the news for any 
evidence that our current lead "negotiators" and global strategists are demonstrating any knowledge of 
negotiation or conflict resolution theory. We may "win" the war, but in my view Saddam Hussein is 
the only one who has mastered the techniques of negotiation-holding his "concessions" to the end and 
embarrassing the bravura of our unilateral actions-let's see where we are when this is published. 
Military might might dominate over negotiation, but that is short-term victory, the longer term will 
certainly be more complicated. 
34. We arc nol, alas, at "the end of history" with democratic capitalism regnant. See Fukuyama, 
supra note 29. 
35. This is the global or "cross-cultural" version of what I used to call the $64,000 question (now $1 
million?) in "domestic" legal negotiation. How can you be a problem-solver when the other side 
doesn't share your goals or ends, or want to play your game? See, FISHER & URY, supra note 2, at 
107-43, 153-54. 
36. The conference was sponsored by the Hewlett Foundation, George Mason University'S Institute 
for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, and the City University of New York's Dispute Resolution 
Consortium, and it was held at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and at the United Nations. 
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there was little theory that was useful "in the moment" to these skilled negotiators. 
They developed that "je ne sais quoi" we call 'judgment" from years of experi-
ence
37 
and could make terrible mistakes if their "calls" were wrong (often based 
on rather primitive taxonomies like "crazies, crusaders, and criminals,,).38 Sec-
ond, their taxonomies or classifications were developed post hoc, because they 
needed to transmit their learning to new recruits, juniors in the field who were 
now "educated" in classrooms, as well as in the field of experience - a form of 
field "inductive" method of hypothesis generation.39 It sounded pretty crude -
three categories of hosta~e takers with appropriately adapted techniques and ap-
proaches for negotiation. 0 Where would the 9/11 terrorists be in that taxonomy? 
Third, and most interestingly, the experienced hostage negotiators articulated a 
very clear negotiation plan-"just keep them talking" (which is where they got 
their nickname, "the mouth marines"), keep people safe, and "end the interaction. 
We are not problem-solvers.,,41 
So, this kind of negotiation is radically different from the kind of "deep prob-
lem-solving" that negotiators seeking Pareto-optimal,42 pie expanding, or creative 
solutions would be engaged in. Context matters. Hostage negotiators are fasci-
nating and necessary to our survival, but ultimately, may have very little to tell us 
about negotiations that are not about hostages. The ability to generalize both their 
theory and practice may, in fact, be quite limited. Negotiations with hostages may 
have their own goals and ends ("end it safely and as quickly as possible," don't 
take on solving the underlying problems), techniques (keep talking and "never say 
no"), and categories ("crazies, crusaders, and criminals"), which produce "stock" 
responses or scripts, and role divisions (separate the talkers-negotiators from the 
tactical forces who may have to shoot if negotiations fail). 
Experienced hostage negotiators have now accumulated enough knowledge 
from hundreds of situations that they think they have developed structures, proc-
esses, techniques, and theories. And then there was Waco.43 Even within similar 
"contexts," people who don't fit the categories, or changes in personnel or leader-
ship or failure to coordinate action, or any number of things can make even the 
most context-specific theories fail. As hostage negotiators define their roles to act 
in relatively "short-term" settings (usually no more than twenty-four hours), when 
a "situation" goes longer, as in Waco, the structures, processes, and interventions 
may have to change. Just taking care of the "short-term" safety may not be 
enough. 
37. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS (I 998} (describing the 
"pattern recognition" form of learning that characterizes those who make decisions in emergent situa-
tions (such as firefighters)}. 
38. See Cambria, supra note 30. 
39. See ROBERT EMERSON, CONTEMPORARY FIELD RESEARCH (I 998}; CAROL H. WEISS, 
EVALUATION (2d ed. 1997); SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND DECISION-MAKING (1980). 
40. One of these skilled negotiators has turned his "theory in use" (see DONALD SCHON, THE 
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1983» into more "c's"-context, conversation, containment. Cambria, 
supra note 30, at 334. 
41. Id. at 335. 
42. See RAIFFA, supra note 2. 
43. JAYNE SEMINARE DOCHERTY, LEARNING LESSONS FROM WACO: WHEN THE PARTIES BRING 
THEIR GODS TO THE NEGOTIATION TABLE (200 I). 
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What lessons have we learned? Even seemingly tightly circumscribed con-
textual domains may be difficult to generalize about and certainly some contexts 
are so specific they do not lend themselves to any further generalization. Wi\1 
9111 happen again? Waco? What can we or should we learn in this situation that 
is useful for other "similar" situations? What can we define as "similar"? Is hos-
tage taking of ones' own community (Waco) the same as taking hostages in a 7-
Eleven store, in a foreign embassy (Iran, Peru), on American property abroad, or 
of a part of one's own "nation" (Palestinians, Tutsis)? And how can we avoid the 
opposite bias, of seeing too much "similarity" when there is none-the distortions 
of recentness and vividness causing us to "over-generalize" from our most recent 
experience and see causal patterns from after the fact, otherwise known as the 
"hindsight bias.''''4 
Let us explore what lessons we have, and can, learn more systematically from 
attempts to generalize conflict resolution theories across domains. My argument 
here is that I think we may actually learn more from exploring "differences" or 
"contradictions" in the application of general theories to more discrete conflict 
resolution domains, than attempting to build grand, general theories across dis-
similar contexts. I will use a few illustrative examples here, from attempts to 
generalize theory about structure, process, common "concepts," personnel in-
volved in and alternatives to conflict and conflict resolution. 
III. STRUCTURES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Negotiation and conflict resolution theory, like international relations theory 
in political science, have developed "models" or "structures" of explanatory 
frameworks. These are schemas (often with accompanying pictures, charts, and 
graphs) plotting the structure of conflict and cooperation that expand, deflate, 
escalate and then resolve, settle, or exhaust a dispute or conflict. There has been 
some convergence and coordination of theoretical structures in both domestic and 
international conflict.4s From anthropologist P.H. Gulliver's mapping of alternat-
ing processes of conflict, contention, concession, and conciliation, derived from 
negotiations in African moots and other "foreign" locales46 (or the alternation of 
"virtuous and vicious cycles" in negotiations), to the adaptation of such models to 
the stages and phases of negotiation in litigation (orientation-opening, agenda 
setting, demands-conflicts, bargaining-brainstorming, concessions-problem-
44. See BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 6; Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases 
in Conflict Resolution and How to Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK, supra note 2. 
45. Of course each field has its own internal debates and disputes about which pictures, charts, and 
graphs are most accurate, even with widely disparate and contested approaches. In conflict resolution, 
we continue to debate whether disputes are more likely to be distributive (zero-sum), requiring com-
petitive behaviors, or integrative (using problem-solving and coordination behaviors). See P. Terrence 
Hopmann, Bargaining and Problem Solving: Two Perspectives on International Negotiation, in 
TURBULENT PEACE, supra note 5, at 445; James J. White, The Pros and Cons of Gelling to Yes, 34 J. 
LEGAL. EDUC. 115 (1984); Roger Fisher, Comment to James J. White's article "The Pros and Cons of 
Gelling to Yes," 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120 (1984). In international relations, theorists and empiricists 
argue about "realism" vs. "liberalism" and "power structural" vs. "international society" conceptions 
of inter-state conflicts and interventionism. See, e.g., Jack S. Levy, Theories of Interstate and Intra-
state War: A Levels-of Analysis Approach, in TURBULENT PEACE, supra note 5, at 3. 
46. P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS CULTURAL' PERSPECTIVE (Sandra B. 
Burman & Barbara E. Harrell-Bond eds., 1979). 
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solving, agreement, execution)47 and in mediation48 (opening statements, ground 
rules, narratives-statement of issues, needs, interests, facilitated negotiation and 
problem solving, dealing with conflict, agreement, reality testing and execution)49, 
conflict resolution has "structures. ,,50 These structures, or theoretical frameworks, 
organized in the minds of both theorists and empirical students of conflict resolu-
tion revolve around some seemingly "universal" or generalized patterns-the 
dilemmas of competition and cooperation,51 the strategic sharing of information to 
either reveal or hide one's "true bottom line or reservation price," the dilemmas of 
trust and strategy, depending on whether goals are self-interest maximization or 
some form of joint problem solving,s2 the assumptions of tacit, but operational, 
social norms53 such as reciprocity and fairness,54 the difficulties of acting in situa-
tions of uncertainty55 and when a host of identified social, cognitive, and other 
"biases" hinder accurate information processing,56 and motivations and goal satis-
faction are hard to measure. These identified patterns have in tum given shape to 
something that often looks like a football or soccer field: two polarized sides 
competing for "ground" on a scale, usually, of monetary values (but this easily 
becomes land and power in international settings). 
In tum, we have identified a variety of transdisciplinary "concepts," such as 
the ZOPA or zone of possible agreement,57 bottom lines or reservation prices, 
Pareto optimality-efficiency frontiers (when we move to a two axis, multi-issue 
negotiation that looks remarkably like a supply and demand curve from econom-
ics)58 and now BA TNAs59 (best alternative to a negotiated agreement), WATNAs 
(worst alternative to a negotiated agreement), and ATNA's (all or any alternatives 
47. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Stages and Phases of Negotiation, in David Binder & Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, ABA LAWYERING SKILLS PROGRAM, INSTRUCTORS' MANUAL (1983) [hereinafter 
Menkel-Meadow, Stages]; GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SElTLEMENT (1983). 
48. MOORE, supra note 7; KOVACH. supra note 7. 
49. See Center for Mediation in Law, Mediation Training Materials, The Five Stages of Mediation, 
at 2 (2002). 
50. I. William Zartman, The Structure o/Negotiation, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, supra note 
2, at 71. Note this article is titled "the" structure of negotiation, not "a" structure of negotiation or "the 
structures" of negotiation. 
51. See works of Morton Deutsch in social psychology, supra note 2. 
52. Denominated the "creating and claiming" negotiation dilemma by two scholars who have 
worked in many domains. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 6. 
53. Legal scholar Mel Eisenberg argued long ago that negotiations, both within the litigation and 
transaction settings, were characterized by attention to "norms," including both behavioral norms and 
substantive or "legal norms." Melvin Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute 
Selliement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976). The newer version of this argument is 
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
54. BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 6. 
55. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 
1982); RICHARD NISBElT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCES: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF 
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980). 
56. BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 2; Chris Guthrie et aI., Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Robert 
H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers /0 the Resolution ofConjlict, 8 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235 (1993). 
57. RAlfFA, supra note 2, at 108. 
58. See id. at 263. 
59. FISHER & URY, supra note 2. 
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to a negotiated agreement)60 for purposes of measuring and deciding accurately 
between and among "best, worst and most likely" scenarios in litigation decision 
trees61 or strategic military or diplomatic negotiations. 
as: 
We have also derived something close to a few "scientific propositions" such 
1. High demands and aspirations generally do better in distributive ne-
gotiation games unless there is stalemate or walk-out because the high 
demand is so unreasonable it terminates the negotiation;62 
2. The predicted outcome of a two-party, single issue (pricing) negotia-
tion will very often be the mid-point between the first two demands (a 
"split the difference" outcome);63 
3. Matters will often "settle" for values that are closer to the transaction 
costs ("nuisance value") than any rational economic or other merit value 
in the matter;64 and, 
4. Reciprocated cooperation may be more robust and gain-producing 
than competitive defection (in repeated or iterated interactions).65 
Similarly, virtually all negotiation texts, treatises, and analyses develop some 
version of the three or four choices of "strategies," "styles," or "behavioral reper-
toires" that must be chosen: competition (contending, dominating, claiming), 
yielding (cooperating, compromising), problem-solving (collaborating, integrat-
ing, creating),66 or "mixed,,67 strategies. 
More formal international relations models of global negotiation and conflict 
resolution theory have the same ideational "base," even if more elaborately ex-
plained. "Structural" analysis focuses on the dynamics of bi-polar systems (the 
Cold War) versus more multi-lateral and "international systems" approaches to 
strategic conflict strategies and management. As in legal conflict resolution, there 
are issues of representation problems, such as agent-principal, constituency man-
60. These are my terms, in use for years, but many negotiation analysts have used their own versions 
of this recognition that many kinds of alternatives have to be weighed in making choices during a 
negotiation or other conflict resolution process. 
61. See MaIjorie Corman Aaron & David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Method of Evaluating 
the Trial Alternative, in DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR 
LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS (1996). 
62. RAIFFA, supra note 2, at 109-28. See also Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers 
and Out-ol-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go A Long Way. 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. I (1994). 
63. RAIFFA, supra note 2, at 109-28. 
64. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Ac-
tions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). 
65. ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION (1997); ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
66. See I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA 
(updated ed. 1989); FISHER & URY, supra note 2; Menkel-Meadow, Stages, supra note 47; Mary 
Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT (Pauline Graham ed., 1996). 
67. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 6. 
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agement, and power analysis. But international relations must deal with multiple 
actors and focus on "unit" analysis, identifying the negotiators as states, leaders, 
individual diplomats, regional coalitions, or international bodies. The structure is 
made more complex and can't be played entirely on a bi-Iateral soccer field. 
It is no accident that there are seemingly many "correspondences" in struc-
tural analyses of conflict resolution across domestic and international domains. 
The theories of these structures emanate from essentially the same source-post 
World War II and Cold War "game theory,,,68 which elaborated a number of 
"games" or "hypothetical" strategic and mathematical simulations, most notably, 
but not exclusively, "the Prisoner's Dilemma,,69 game. This game in particular 
models how two parties, and then more than two parties, choose to act under con-
ditions of variable communication rules and with variable pay-off schemes. Pro-
liferating studies (in various laboratory and other "simulated" settings, including 
recently developed computer tournaments) were designed to elaborate "optimal 
strategies" for specified conditions, based on Cold War (and mostly bi-lateral) 
scenarios. The template which has emerged from this rich vein of research has 
been "mined" and applied to so many forms of negotiated and strategic interac-
tions, it is often difficult to remember that they are still "games," and games with 
many assumptions built into the "rules." 
Without denying the usefulness of game theoretic insights for elucidating 
structures and "moves" in elaborated hypothetical situations, it is also useful to 
consider the assumptions on which these maps and structures have been built. 
Until relatively recently, conflict resolution in law and related areas focused al-
most exclusively on two-party games, assuming plaintiffs and defendants in a 
litigation structure, with specified information rules (discovery in litigation, modi-
fied by more "disclosing" negotiation customs). More recently, work in domestic 
negotiation has recognized that in domestic legal disputes, as in the international 
arena, most conflicts and disputes are multi_party,7o requiring new maps and theo-
ries. Coalition theory and group process theory,? I long used in international rela-
tions, are making their way into domestic and legal conflict resolution theory, with 
borrowed learning from sociology and social psychology,n but the theoretical 
power may be limited in different contexts. 
68. See AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY (1999); R. DUNCAN LUCE & 
HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, 
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1967). 
69. See WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 11-64 (1992). See also DOUGLAS BAIRD ET 
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1998). 
70. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a Pos/modern, Multicul-
tural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996). 
71. See LEIGH L. THOMPSON, MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 188-219 (2d ed. 2000); Gary 
Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 243 (1994); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, II 0 YALE L. J. 71 (2000). 
72. See Solomon Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judg-
ments, in GROUP LEADERSHIP AND MEN (H. Guetzkow ed., 1951); ROBERT B. CALDlNI, INFLUENCE: 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1993); Deutsch, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note 2; IRVING 
L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (1983); JOSEPH LUFT, GROUP PROCESSES (3d ed. Mayfield Publishing Co. 
1984) (1963); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1983); 
Stanley Milgram, Behavorial Study of Obedience, 67 1. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371 
(1963). 
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Game theory and strategy in conflict resolution all too often assume rational-
ity, individual gain maximization, whether from an economic or power perspec-
tive and externally manipulated information endowments. This assumption of 
rational gain or rational choice has been increasingly questioned by anthropolo-
gists who challenge its "cultural" assumptions,73 political scientists and social 
psychologists who question its empirical reality/4 and feminist theorists who 
question its epistemological origins.75 What if most disputes are not two-party? 
What if maximizing "gain," however measured, is not the only goal? What if 
communication is not binary (on or off), but a combination of revelations, guarded 
sharing, reciprocal messages, misleading statements, and outright deceptions, 
which are themselves "negotiated"? What if the players in the game are not all 
playing with the same pay-off structure (goals or ends) or resources with which to 
play the game? What if new games are introduced, such as "Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commissions" which are neither punishment ("prisoner's dilemma") nor 
restorative (mediation) but some new mixture of confession, accountability, and 
forgiveness?76 How do the new "games" get written into the canon that creates 
the structures and maps of our theory?77 
In a provocative book, political scientist Benjamin Miller has recently argued 
that polarized opponents, such as in the Cold War, were actually able to engage in 
a variety of cooperative activities because of the "balance" produced by nuclear 
deterrence. This in tum introduced more predictability into world conflicts than 
the current unstable multi-national post-Cold War alignments.78 Two hegemons, 
the Soviet Union and the United States, could restrain more "minor disputes" 
within their spheres of influence, as well as "contain" each other. With unilateral 
action (of one hegemon) or diffusion of power with many multiple actors, some 
forms of restraint and control of conflict are removed, and alliance and regional 
influence declines with an increase in local conflicts. How prescient Miller was-
his work was written long before our recent failures to develop a "coalition" 
within our own NATO alignment on disarming and warring with Iraq. Diffusion 
of power may actually make some forms of cooperation less likely in international 
relations. Miller's structures, which divide intended and unintended conflicts and 
73. See AVRUCH, CULTURE, supra note 2; Kevin Avruch, Culture and Negotiation Pedagogy, 16 
NEGOTIATION J. 339 (2000). 
74. See BEYOND SELF-INTEREST (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, 
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1994); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY 
DEMOCRACY (1994). 
75. See CONFLICT AND GENDER (Anita Taylor & Judi Beinstein Miller eds., 1994); GENDER, PEACE 
AND CONFLICT (Inger Skjelsboek & Dan Smith eds., 2001); Deborah M. Kolb, More than Just a Foot-
note: Constructing a Theoretical Framework for Teaching about Gender in Negotiation, 16 
NEGOTIATION J. 347 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Negotiating with Lawyers, Men and Things: 
The Contextual Approach Still Matters, 17 NEGOTIATION J. 257 (2001); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Teaching about Gender and Negotiation: Sex, Truths and Videotape, 16 NEGOTIATION J. 357 (2000). 
76. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998). 
77. In a classic example of sociological "labeling" theory, the very name of the game can alter 
behaviors in the game. See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in 
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 2 (showing that the games, although identical in 
content, called "Wall Street" or "Social Work" produced different behaviors in the players). See also 
Robert H. Frank et aI., Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (1996); Robert H. 
Frank et aI., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (1993). 
78. BENJAMIN MILLER, WHEN OPPONENTS COOPERATE (2002). 
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cooperative acts among conflicting and cooperating nation-states and regional 
coalitions, is an example of the kind of rigorous and far more complex "modeling" 
we need to understand the varieties of contexts in which conflict resolution is 
practiced.79 Note, however, that for all the criticism of bi-polarism in modern 
dispute resolution theory, Miller's thesis suggests that a powerful "two-party" 
game may actually have led to more stability or "equilibria" points, in game theo-
retic terms. 
Miller suggests that with the demise of the two-party power "balance," new 
models might be necessary, such as a return to a nineteenth century notion of a 
"concert" of nations, which produced more "peace" in part of the nineteenth cen-
tury than we had in the twentieth.8o His models may turn out to be too rigid as 
well as too dependent, in my view, on the interesting results that come from ag-
gregating data on world conflicts, a quantitative "game" that social scientists play 
to look for Durkheimian "social facts"SI and patterns that may not be visible to the 
"naked eye." In my view, this fascinating effort at knowledge acquisition makes 
many errors of "unit analysis." It is virtually impossible to "code" all the vari-
ables that go into each global conflict (such as the measures of intra-national and 
international "incidents" of violence, economic factors, political party structures, 
ethnic-religious demographics, weapons, and other resource measures) though 
some have argued we should begin to develop such data bases for domestic, as 
well as international, conflicts and disputes. s2 Miller also demarcates "crisis man-
agement" (e.g. Cuban missile crisis) from more "normal" efforts at international 
conflict management and cooperation (resource sharing, war prevention, peaceful 
interventions, etc.), suggesting that, as with domestic hostage negotiations, we 
may need to have separate models and structures for "short-term" emergent situa-
tions and longer-term, iterated negotiations and conflict prevention interventions. 
Sadly, however, Miller, like the reporters of "successes" in North Korea and 
the Mideast in the mid-1990s, cannot do much to explain a post-9fII world. With 
multi-national loyalties (AI Qaeda and other militant and fundamentalist Arab 
organizations) and new technologies for communication and sabotage, some have 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE (John A. Spaulding & George Simpson trans., reissue ed. 1997); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies: The Importance of Engaged Social Science in 
Legal Studies, 18 FLA. ST. L. REV. 91 (1990). 
82. There has been a very active debate on the possibilities of developing metrics for measuring 
conflict and dispute resolution successes at the domestic level, well behind the work already conducted 
by quantitative international relations scholars. See Cary Coglianese, Is Satisfaction Success? Evaluat-
ing Public Participation in Regulatory Policy Making, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Rosemary O'Leary & Lisa A. Bingham eds., 2003); JAMES 
S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? (2000) (featuring the debate around the issuance 
of the RAND study of court management devices and ADR in federal courts); DONNA STIENSTRA ET 
AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE 
MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, (The Federal Judicial Center 1997); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., 
MEDIATING LAND DISPUTES: PROS AND CONS (Lincoln Land Institute April 2000); Cary Coglianese, 
Empirical and Experimental Methods of Law: Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 ILL. 
L. REV. 1111 (2002); Craig A. McEwen & Elizabeth Plapinger, Rand Report Points Way to Next 
Generation of ADR Research, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 10; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1871 (1997). 
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called our current conditions a "viral war," where the stateless "enemies" move 
easily through porous boundaries of both physical and computer space, issuing 
decentralized, non-state, non-"party" orders or "authority" for actions to be taken, 
not "negotiated." 
Other analysts have noted that not only who we have conflicts with, but what 
we have disputes about may further particularize and change our theoretical struc-
tures-whether we consider current international conflicts as driven by ideology 
(democracy vs. fundamentalism) or resources (oil, labor, water etc.). Fault lines 
of conflict and regional and global cooperation and competition may change the 
"neighborhoods" of disputing and alter both geographical lines of demarcation, as 
well as geo-political lines of negotiation, alignments, and potential zones of vio-
lence.83 What happens when a neighborhood or community dispute escalates to a 
global dispute? Is there any useful analogy from our major urban conflagrations 
and search for national peace? Here, the structural component is a strong national 
government, with multiple layers of social control, whether by law enforcement or 
multiple political entities. The power and legitimacy of our "international gov-
ernment," while always contested, seems increasingly divided and weak, not to 
mention without its own legitimate legal enforcement mechanisms.84 The struc-
tures and theories of conflict resolution must also take into account "maps" of the 
regime (or absences) of law and legal institutions standing as "back-ups" to the 
negotiation and mediative processes currently being described. 
It is not clear what the ZOPAs, BATNAs, and "bottom lines" are in some of 
these modem international conflicts. It is quite clear, however, that we are not 
playing on a soccer field--our "turf' has been "invaded" and so we planned an 
unauthorized incursion onto a whole other field. The globe, by the way, is round, 
not flat, and it is time, I think, to have the pictures of our theories conform to spa-
tial reality. Efforts to create multi-lateral coalitions are failing as I write (things 
will likely be different by the time this is published) and Miller's hopes for a con-
flict preventing "concert" of democratic nations to act as a sort of self-appointed 
third party neutral (more in the med-arb model than the "pure mediator") does not 
appear to be taking shape. Our opponents, whomever they currently are (Saddam 
Hussein, Kim II Sung, Osama Bin Laden and AI Qaeda), may be playing a "pris-
oner's dilemma game," but maximizing their own well being does not appear to 
be a major goal. "Freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose," as Janis 
Joplin would say. 85 
The assumptions of the pictures and structures we have developed for domes-
tic negotiation and conflict resolution models do not translate well when we are 
dealing with non-rational actors. Perhaps negotiating with hostage takers will 
have more relevance, but I doubt it, because we are likely to damage many inno-
cent people when the tactical forces come in and we have not been very successful 
at the "keep them talking" strategy. Negotiation and conflict resolution models 
and structures assume that we want to keep playing games together (the great 
83. Michael T. Klare, The New Geography o/Conflict, 80 FOREIGN AfF. 49 (2001). 
84. When the superpower refuses to acknowledge the international court, it is hard to know how 
enforcement will be achieved. Behind the pictures of football fields and prisoners' cells lies a court, a 
state, a referee, or some third party, with ultimate ability to "force" a solution if a consensual one is not 
reached. 
85. JANIS JOPLIN, Me and Bobby McGee, on PEARL (Columbia 1971). 
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relief of the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis was that the Soviets did want to 
keep playing, not dying) and that we can "map" moves on a two-dimensional 
space. While expanding our models and pictures to include multi-lateral ism (in-
ternationally) and multi-partyism (in American domestic disputes) has begun to 
change the structures slightly, I think we are prisoners of our own game. These 
structures (of two-party mini-max games) are so strongly imbedded in our learn-
ing, and our leaders' consciousnesses, that I know even I still process and analyze 
all negotiations through these lenses. Increasingly, I think there is something 
wrong with these pictures. While it would be nice to have the scientific rigor of a 
negotiation structure that worked across domains, I don't think we currently have 
one. It might behoove us to start imagining, creating, thinking about, and drawing 
some "structures" that more accurately describe the particularity of the situations, 
both internationally and domestically. How about photography with its specific-
ity, rather than abstract graphs? 
IV. PROCESSES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
In many ways the study and practice of conflict and conflict resolution origi-
nated in international dispute resolution. International relations, peace studies, 
and anthropological studies of disputing outside of the United States all predate 
the "modem" ADR movement.86 Nevertheless, the techniques, technology, and 
apparatus of conflict resolution "processes" are much more professionalized and 
developed in domestic dispute resolution. From the proliferation of texts and 
training programs in negotiation, mediation, facilitation, consensus building, and 
now dialoging, the domestic dispute resolution field has professionalized, if not 
fully credentialed, its practical knowledge base. Techniques are offered for prob-
lem-solving, integrative and principled bargaining, interest-based bargaining in 
labor negotiations,87 mediation as a general process, and mediation tailored to 
environmental, intellectual property, community, family, and commercial dis-
putes. The technology of dispute resolution is a growing import-export business. 
Almost anyone who has been trained as a mediator can tum around and train oth-
ers-a slavish adherence to the medical model of clinical education-"see one, do 
one, teach one." Some professionals in the field were trained domestically and 
now work internationally (I am one of those); others began working internation-
ally (perhaps at high levels of diplomacy, with or without training) and now work 
domestically (many former politicians, Cabinet officers, and state department 
officials); others are experts in particular geographical areas of the world, or in 
particular subject matters of disputes, and a whole cadre of diplomats, retired 
judges, and other "elder statesmen" become mediators, arbitrators, and negotiators 
86. For a well-told history of mediation, arbitration, and conciliation in the United States, see 
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983). However, the modem dispute resolution 
movement, in law, is usually dated from the 1976 Pound Conference where Frank Sander delivered his 
"Varieties of Dispute Processing" paper, subsequently to be termed the "Multi-Door Courthouse." 
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties o/Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. III (1976). 
87. See RICHARD E. WALTON ET AL., STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS: A THEORY OF CHANGE IN LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1994) (specifying propositions derived from a "strategic" approach to 
negotiations in the changed labor-management context, distinguishing the "social contract" (on-going 
goals) from the "substantive outcomes" (particularities in the final agreements)}. 
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by virtue of their status or prior achievements in the world, without any formal 
training at all. 
With the increased sensitivity to different process technologies and differen-
tiation of processes, it is easy to see some of the correspondences of techniques 
and also some of the dangers of moving from one level to another. In mediation, 
for example, the separate "caucus" sessions at which parties reveal their real "un-
derlying interests" can be likened to the "back channels" or "dual-track" negotia-
tions of diplomatic disputes. The same tensions between public and transparent 
proceedings and more secretive and confidential meetings exist in both realms, 
though the role of the press, democratic government processes, and the sheer 
numbers of people involved may make disclosure slightly more likely in interna-
tional settings. At the same time, the likely fact of multiple layers of negotiators 
makes it more possible to actually have totally secret negotiations take place (in-
cluding the "fictionalized" "Walk in the Woods,,)88 in the international arena. 
There are also some correspondences in the role of representatives and the in-
ternal negotiations of constituencies, like clients with lawyers, union members 
with union negotiators, governments with diplomats, and the larger polity and the 
formal state, but these analogies should not be taken too far. 89 Internal negotia-
tions in international matters are often as complex as any "across the table" nego-
tiations and because international negotiations are often binding on a full polity 
with generational effects, ratification by those actually affected by a negotiation is 
quite different from other agent-led negotiations, if it exists at all. 
The role of third parties varies in different contexts, though again, there has 
been some borrowing (mostly one-way in my view and mostly not for the better) 
from the international sphere to the domestic. The notion of the embedded and 
interested "wise elder" as mediator cum shuttle diplomat has been growing since 
Henry Kissinger's many efforts in the Mideast. Senior diplomats and government 
officials from the United States, with clear geo-political interests of their own, 
have been intervening in disputes as mediators, arbitrators, and "judges" for sev-
eral decades now, and sadly, in my view, this idea of the enmeshed mediator (or 
mediator with "muscle" or "expertise") has now infiltrated public policy, legal, 
and even family disputes, returning to some of the ancient inspirations for the 
mediator in rural cultures where "wise elders" were the only acceptable author-
'ty 90 I . 
In the domestic context, mediators often prefer to think of themselves as 
"third party neutrals" engaged in a detached and unbiased "facilitative" process. 
Of course, in reality, all of these characteristics (neutrality, detachment and lack of 
bias,91 as well as "facilitative,,92) are contested. But, increasingly, retired judges, 
88. LEE BLESSING, A WALK IN THE WOODS: A PLAY IN Two ACTS (1988) (giving a fictionalized 
account of the private relations of two top-level diplomats, which is said to reflect the process by 
which the Gorbachev regime negotiated itself into a new world order). 
89. For an effort to explore the issues in agent-principal negotiations across domains, see 
NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS (Robert H. Mnookin & Lawrence E. Susskind eds., 1999). 
90. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 6 (1986). 
91. See Howard Gadlin & Elizabeth Pino, Neutrality: A Guide/or the Organizational Ombudsper-
son, 13 NEGOTIATION. J. 17 (1997). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction to 
MEDIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2001). 
92. See, e.g., Lela Love, The Top 10 Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 937, 939 (1997). 
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elder statesmen, and other "notables" engage in shuttle diplomacy to settle major 
class action lawsuits, community disputes, and in the case of some politicians, like 
Jesse Jackson or Jimmy Carter, may intervene in international disputes without 
formal portfolio, authority, or training. 
Often the dynamics of domestic and international conflicts might seem simi-
lar.93 For example, when asked how the United States was attempting to get allies 
for its proposed resolution in the UN to authorize war against Iraq, one major 
senior official in Washington said, "this is just like lobbying for legislation in 
Congress-threats and promises, sticks and carrots, money for pet projects, threats 
to take aid away,,,94 a "standard" log-rolling negotiation process. On the other 
hand, even with all the tum-over in Congress, lobbying for legislation usually 
focuses around two relatively stable parties and "opponents." These days we 
appear to change our allies for international strategic reasons almost yearly. Con-
sider the U.S. "friendships" with Iraq, Iran, Colombia, Pakistan, India, Russia, and 
others. Consider what this does to notions of trust building and reputation mar-
kets95 as they are conceptualized in domestic negotiation theory. 
Most significantly, some modem international conflicts, both interstate and 
intra-state (South Africa, Rwanda, Argentina, Israel and its Arab neighbors) can 
demonstrate some of the fallacy of blind application of domestic conflict resolu-
tion processes, such as mediation. Mediation's ideology as a problem solving 
device, asks people to focus on the future, contrasted to adjudication, arbitration, 
and litigation, which seeks to find the facts and judge the truth of what happened 
before, in order to provide some remedial relief in the present. This model of 
future orientation will not often be effective in inter-ethnic, race-based, or geno-
cidal conflicts, or conflicts following or during mass violence or "unjust" regimes 
and wars. While the disadvantages of "ignoring" the past have also been noted 
domestically, primarily by feminists96 and race theorists, who seek a focus on the 
past for accountability and 'justice" in mediation, for the most part, mediation has 
kept its eye on the "on-going" or future relationship.97 Attempts to avoid the con-
flicts and disagreeable arguments about "what happened" before in the standard 
forms of mediation will not work as peace seekers attempt to mediate long-
standing ethnic conflicts, especially when marked by bloodshed, violence, long-
standing economic inequalities, or other historical unfairness. So overuse or mis-
appropriated use of domestic mediation models will not work to achieve "truth 
and reconciliation" in such climates. Fortunately, new processes have come out of 
93. For one effort to describe "the" negotiation process, as a universalized set of issues, see Christo-
pher Dupont & Guy-Olivier Faure, The Negotiation Process, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, supra 
note 2. 
94. National Public Radio, All Things Considered, Feb. 25, 2003 (notes on file with author). 
95. See Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 
(1989). 
96. See. e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ. 
1545 (1991). 
97. Most descriptions of mediation quote Lon Fuller's famous sentence about the ability of media-
tion to "re-orient the parties to each other," assuming a continuing "future" relationship. See Lon 
Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Its Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971). 
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such conflicts (such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions)98 and these might, 
in tum, have some influence in some of our domestic disputes.99 
Similarly, feminists, race theorists, and other critics have focused on the re-
curring issues of power imbalances (whether economic, political, temporal, social, 
class, racial, ethnic, religious, or gendered) 100 in the assumptions that most conflict 
resolution processes make about party participation. This is one process issue that 
has actually lent itself to devising process strategies that have been effective or at 
least suggestive, across domains. Alliances with other "weak" parties, demands 
for representation, refusal to participate, funding of resources to participate, and 
strategic "irrationality" (think Saddam Hussein or North Korea), have enabled the 
less powerful in a number of contexts to enhance their power in various processes, 
whether through rational "game-playing" strategies or efforts to break or change 
the game. This is an area that clearly merits "comparative" and multiple-level 
study. 
Wholesale or thoughtless transfer of Americanized "talking cures" of "talking 
it out" in mediation are less likely to work in reticent cultures or in cultures where 
social unequals cannot meet and discuss to consensually negotiate their problems. 
Negotiation and mediation processes, however staged or structured, involve 
strategies of communication and speech. With the wide variety of difficult com-
munication issues in domestic mediation and negotiation (information sharing, 
trust, empowerment, problem solving, active listening, reframing,IOI etc.), adding 
the complexities of "culture," whether intercultural or mixed-cultural,102 in other 
contexts, suggests that conflict resolution processes will be more variable than 
uniform, and therefore making export of American models likely to be somewhat 
problematic. Even with our own focus on "multi-cultural" mediation and in-
creased sensitivity to the communication and teleological issues involved in such 
processes domestically, our commitments to equality, democracy, and "multi-
culturalism," however deeply held within our own nation, are deeply ideologi-
cally, culturally, and legally based in the U.S. political culture. Our "process im-
perialism" is one of the complaints of such critics as Laura Naderl03 who suggests, 
at the least, that these are acts of cultural imperialism and, at the worst, that inter-
national and U.S. bodies, like USAID, the State Department, the World Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund are imposing U.S. styles of dispute resolution (in 
mediation and commercial and investment arbitration) in nations that have neither 
98. See Kevin Avruch & Beatriz Vejarano, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: A Review Essay 
and Annotated Bibliography, 2 Soc. JUSTICE: ANTHROPOLOGY, PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 47 
(2001 ). 
99. There is some evidence of this in a recent settlement of the Cincinnati civil rights class action 
against the police department. See In re Cincinnati Policing, Collaborative Agreement, No. C-I-99-
317, at http://www.ariagroup.comlFINAL_document.html(last visited Nov. 22,2003); see also JAY 
ROTHMAN, RESOLVING [DENTITY-BASED CONFLICTS ([ 997). 
100. See Richard Delgado et a!., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. [359 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the Haves 
Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 19 (1999); Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL. 
THEORY 670 (2001). 
101. See DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS (1999). 
102. THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER (Pat Chewed., 200 I). 
103. See Nader, Current Illusions and Delusions, supra note 13. 
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the resources, nor the legal system, to support such "exogenously" created institu-
tions. I04 
With increasing attempts to conceptualize the differences between bi-lateral 
and multi-lateral negotiation and dispute resolution processes, some have argued 
that bi-lateral negotiations permit greater informality and situation-specific "rules" 
or norms of procedure, where multi-lateral negotiations are more likely to lead to 
formalism and the need for formal "rules of process" and "rules of decision," such 
as those producing majority votes and compromise or lowest common denomina-
tor solutions. lOS While international negotiations may be characterized by greater 
formality, such as the need for translators, trans-system rules of procedure, cus-
toms of diplomacy, etc., domestic multi-party negotiations have, in fact, been the 
occasion for relativel~ great innovation, with Lawrence Susskind's "Rules of 
Consensus Building,,1 6 substituting for "Robert's Rules of Order"I07 and permit-
ting "consensus" rules of process and decision that actually "improve" outcomes 
away from compromises and lowest common denominators to searches for "better 
outcomes" that attempt to hear and take account of multiple party needs and inter-
ests. IOS Here the interesting question is whether less formal Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) in the international arena will more successfully introduce 
less formal and different kinds of processes to the more "formal" and "official" 
channels of negotiation. Again, I suspect, context (which issues, which groups, 
which nations or other demarcations) will have greater effects on process innova-
tion than any "universal" process intervention. 
In the commercial realm, many commentators have noted that American liti-
gation processes are transforming European and civil law traditions in interna-
tional arbitrations, choking them with discovery, motions, and other adversarial 
practices, like cross-examination and other proceedings that are said to be displac-
ing European actors (both lawyers and arbitrators) with Americans, in the compe-
tition for legal and occupational control of this process. I09 Similarly, although 
\04. Id. In the "import-export" business of ADR some argue that absence of a legitimate and trusted 
legal system prevents full assimilation and acceptance of a supplementary set of institutions to offer 
different forms of conflict resolution (I am one of these), while others suggest that ADR institutions 
may be developed to substitute for underdeveloped or corrupt legal systems. See Alkon, supra note 
23. 
105. Franz Cede, The Legal Perspective on International Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIA-
TION, supra note 2, at 151. 
106. THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 99-136. See also SUSAN CARPENTER 
& W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES (2d. ed. 2001); E. FRANKLIN DUKES ET AL., 
REACHING FOR HIGHER GROUND (2000). 
107. HENRY M. ROBERT, ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER (lOth ed. Perseus Pub. 2000) (1876). 
108. I do not want to overdraw the domestic and international claims here. Consensus building proc-
esses have been used in many international disputes and policy settings, such as the Kyoto Accords, 
other environmental causes, human rights treaties, etc. Furthermore, the domestic use of such proc-
esses as consensus building and negotiated rule-making remain controversial. See Cary Coglianese, 
Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rule-Making, 46 DUKE L. J. 1255 
(\ 997); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Government in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. I 
(\997); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations, 71 GEO. L. J. I (\982). 
109. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 13; Bryant G. Garth & Yves Dezalay, Fussing About the 
Forum: Categories and Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Competition, 21 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 
285 (1996); see also Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New Marketfor Disputes: A Framework 
.lor Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUDIES L. POL. & SOC'Y 367 (\ 992) (focusing on the 
domestic side of "competitions" of different processes within the justice system). 
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intended to be "alternative" international bodies for dispute settlement, the ICSID 
and WTO are also said to be looking more and more like American-style adjudi-
cative fora, rather than international arbitral or even mediative bodies. In the 
commercial arena, private business ventures, utilizing aspects of both bi-Iateral 
and multi-lateral negotiations are probably more likely to develop process innova-
tions and opportunities for flexible and informal conflict resolution possibilities, 
including the use of some mediation processes in transactional (joint venture capi-
tal) settings. I 10 
So, does it matter that none of the processes of conflict resolution are "pure" 
anymore, or that they travel, either welI or not, but get transformed in the process 
of trans-border movement? As I have noted elsewhere, III Lon Fuller, the "found-
ing" jurisprude of ADR, warned us of the "moral integrity" of each process we 
might use to resolve disputes or create legislation or other social norms for human 
interaction. 112 While I am a firm believer that the primary forms can be combined 
to provide flexible hybrids and adaptation to particular settings, I worry that 
thoughtless transposition of different processes to different cultures is not good, 
either for the processes themselves or the people affected by them. U.S.-style 
ADR was a reaction to the rigidity, slowness, expense, and adversarial structure of 
U.S. courts, as well as a claim for increased participation in a highly developed 
democratic, if grid-locked, polity.113 Transfer of our ADR processes to other 
places without those "back-up" traditional institutions may be doomed to fail, 
such as when arbitration is offered or "crammed down" by the State Department 
or World Bank as a condition of financial aid, where the arbitration system and 
administering agency is no less corrupt than the corrupt courts it was designed to 
replace or supplement. 
Traditions of disputing, whether in private matters or public, may vary in 
terms of when only the main "parties" are brought in and when other "stake-
holders," interested parties, or the larger community will be engaged. Thus, stu-
dents of process will have to expand and broaden the theories derived from bi-
lateral negotiations, adversarial litigation models, and even the triadic threesome 
of mediation or arbitration. More sophisticated theory development is proceeding 
in multi-party processes in such domestic settings as consensus building, multi-
party and class-action litigation, as well as community and environmental dis-
putes. International disputes have more often been mUlti-party and conceptualized 
as such (even with the binarism of Cold War analysis). Whether coalition forma-
tion, third party intervention, representative and constituent participation, ratifica-
tion, process rules, and decision rules (the "conceptual tools" of mUlti-party dis-
110. See Christophe Dupont, International Business Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, 
supra note 2. 
Ill. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. I, 13-22 (2000). 
112. LON FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDERING (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 200 I). 
113. Debates about whether the founding impulses for ADR were "quantitatively" based on case load 
reduction and efficiency or "qualitatively" based on more party participation and better outcomes for 
the parties continue apace. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Pursuing Sell/ement in an Adversary 
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or the Law of ADR, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. I (1991). 
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pute resolution) can be generalized to many different contexts and levels of action 
. h' 114 remams an open researc questIOn. 
Though I am an avid student of general conflict resolution theories and am 
particularly interested in research questions about the role (and ethics) of third 
party intervention,115 as well as dyadic and multi-party negotiations, even when 
not "facilitated," I think studies of the processes of direct, as well as facilitated, 
negotiation and the role of third party intervention need to be contextually sensi-
tive. Intervention in family disputes, though also about relationships, is not the 
same as intervention in international disputes, where cultural "sensitivity," history, 
expertise, and other factors may distinguish the types of processes and interven-
tions to be used. 
V. CONCEPTS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
In addition to our "construction" of universalized models of structure and 
process, the field of conflict resolution has isolated a number of "concepts" of 
inquiry. As legal and social anthropologists like Laura Nader and Richard Abel 
attempted to redefine "disputes" as a more universal and capacious concept for 
comparative study, away from the legalized forms of "cases," I 16 we have identi-
fied a number of concepts in our field, with expectations of multi-level explana-
tory purchase. I will simply mention a few here, as illustrations of efforts we need 
to make to be careful while studying these concepts rigorously and critically 
across domains. 
One of the most important contributions of modern conflict resolution theory 
has been the move from "positions," "offers," or "demands" to "underlying inter-
ests."II? While this important conceptual and terminological "move" has assisted 
our ability to develop problem-solving processes in both domestic and interna-
tional contexts, 118 by focusing on the underlying "causes" or larger context of the 
conflicts that cause "disputes," this terminology has itself been criticized for its 
instrumental, preference-seeking, and utility-based rationalistic or economic con-
ception of what motivates people in conflict. In the international arena, John Bur-
ton made an early claim for a theory of "human needs,,,119 as I have done (with a 
feminist and social welfare impulse) in the domestic sphere. l2o These terms are 
important. The "needs" theory asks us to look "behind" the stated "interests," just 
as the re-conceptualization of "interests" asked us to look "behind" the stated 
demands or "positions." A focus on "needs" asks us to consider not just what 
114. For some attempts to specify general principles here, see RAIFFA, supra note 2; James K. Seben-
ius, Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First?, in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, 
GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS (Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996). 
115. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics/or A New Practice, 70 
TENN. L. REV. 63 (2002). 
116. See Richard Abel, A Comparative Study 0/ Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & SOC'y REV. 
217 (1973); Nader, Current I/Iusions and Delusions, supra note 13. 
117. See FISHER & URY, supra note 2; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 6. 
118. JOHN W. BURTON, CONFLICT & COMMUNICATION (1969); JOHN W. BURTON, CONFLICT: 
RESOLUTION AND PREVENTION (1990); JOHN BURTON, RESOLVING DEEP-ROOTED CONFLICT: A 
HANDBOOK ( 1987). 
119. JOHN W. BURTON, CONFLICT: HUMAN NEEDS THEORY (1990). 
120. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 6. 
HeinOnline -- 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 343 2003
No.2] Correspondences and Contradictions 343 
parties in negotiations or contlicts can demand or articulate for themselves, but 
asks us to focus on basic human needs, whether Maslovian l21 or some other 
framework, to go beyond what parties claim and to focus on social justice issues. 
"Needs" may include such intangibles as respect, dignity, care, sympathy, empa-
thy, apology, and recognition, or such material items as economic aid, income 
stability, land, food, shelter or "ownership," and control. Asking questions about 
"needs" may help us develop models of contlict resolution and negotiation that go 
beyond the "rational" into what some, like Jon Elsterl22 and 1,123 have called the 
emotional, passionate, or spiritual (or religious) realms, which are not captured in 
game theoretic pictures of conflict resolution, and which seem ever more relevant 
to current conflicts. At the same time that "needs" appear "underneath" interests 
and other expressions of what parties desire in a negotiation or conflict setting, 
there may be other, newer ways to describe these concerns, when contexts are 
more varied. Whether "needs" or "interests" operate similarly in domestic and 
international settings (whether in individual or collective settings) also requires 
more study. Those who facilitate multi-party or constituent based negotiations 
know how difficult it is to develop, articulate, and negotiate with group-negotiated 
"goals." Note that "goals" itself has an instrumental ending point; more astute 
negotiators and contlict professionals have long noted how party desires, needs, 
and interests are more dynamic than many "negotiation plans" would suggest. 
What we want and why we want it is not just a product of our own "utilities," but 
also a function of comparative assessments-the concept of "relative deprivation" 
should be as important to us conceptually as "reactive devaluation." When one 
party learns what another "has," "wants," or "needs," those stated desiderata may 
well change in the comparison dynamics that is the fuel of many conflict proc-
esses. 
The focus on "relationships" in negotiation and contlict resolution has long 
been with us. Indeed, one of the most robust analytical concepts has been the 
consideration of whether those engaged in negotiation or conflict resolution are 
having a "one-shot" interaction or a "repeated" interaction. Much of negotiation 
and contlict resolution theory turns on these notions of "one-off' or "continuing 
relations." Recently, those in the international field have even come to adopt the 
full psychological terms of family therapy and mediation to note the importance of 
creating, sustaining, and working on "relationships.,,124 It is important to note, 
however, that relationships come in many forms-the relationships of states to 
each other (mediated and affected by who are the leaders, diplomats, and official 
spokespeople of a state over time) are different than the relationships of citizens or 
inhabitants of different states (tourists, refugees, and abstracted "others"); litigants 
may be former partners, lovers, continuing business dealers, or total strangers. 
Just as in personal relationships, in the international realm, there are complex 
121. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (2d ed. 1970). 
122. JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1999); JON ELSTER, 
SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LiMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY (1989). 
123. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction to DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY (2003); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyers' Role(s) ill Delibera-
tive Democracy (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
124. HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, A PUBLIC PEACE PROCESS: SUSTAINED DIALOGUE TO TRANSFORM 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS 31-46 (1999). 
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blood and affinity ties. The point here is that while I truly welcome the "tum" 
toward the human element in all negotiations, we must develop more sophisticated 
theories about relationships. If the pop psychology market continues to sell end-
less copies of books on how to improve one's personal relationships, then cer-
tainly the kinds of relationships that exist in legal, community, national, and inter-
national disputes must be more variable than the bi-modal "one-shot vs. continu-
ing." It is clear that some relationships are "coerced" when we share a family, 
living quarters, or geographic boundary; others are chosen-ties of love and mar-
riage (in some cultures) and organizational participation; others are "strategic 
alliances" in business or global politics and most importantly, all of these relation-
ships shift and change themselves over time, as conditions, including affective, 
economic, political, and strategic, change themselves. Consider the amazing 
transformation of relations in Europe from World War II to the present and our 
own relations with Japan, Germany, Russia, and China, just to mention a few that 
have changed radically in a matter of decades. Our relations with other "strategic 
partners" may be more "promiscuous." Our conceptualizations of relationships in 
conflict resolution and negotiation need more variability than they currently have 
to be of much use in description, prescription, and prediction. 
Finally, as a third example, let me focus on the concepts of "ripeness" and 
"deadlines" or the temporal theories of conflict management. As my great nego-
tiation mentor has said, "You gotta know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 
them." 125 Timing in conflict reso lution is a matter of 'j udgment." In international 
relations, William Zartman developed the notion of "ripeness" for resolution or 
intervention when the parties are in a "hurting stalemate.,,126 A version of this 
concept informs much legal dispute resolution as well, such as when judges inter-
vene in settlement conferences or cases are settled on the courthouse steps. But, 
more recently, in both domestic litigation and international affairs, we have begun 
to think about creating more positive approaches to "ripeness" with interveners 
and others acting more actively to "prevent" conflict or to bring the parties to-
gether before they hurt each other so deeply that they are no longer able to com-
municate with each other. "Ripeness," in other words, can be created and manipu-
lated by skilled negotiators or interveners. At the same time, we have also learned 
that intervention too early may not work, as in the case of court-annexed media-
tion programs that ask the parties to mediate or arbitrate without enough discovery 
to have information to know what is at stake or to make accurate assessments of 
the value or strength of the legal claims. 127 Just as with "fruit" from where the 
ripeness metaphorl28 is derived, conflicts may be "unripe" or "overripe." Unlike 
fruit, "ripeness" in dispute resolution can occur at many points along the way.129 
125. KENNY ROGERS, The Gambler, on THE GAMBLER (United Artists 1978). 
126. ZARTMAN, supra note 66. 
127. See Elizabeth Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, Eastern District of Pennsylvania Mediation Pro-
gram, in ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 241-42 (1996). 
128. Though I don't have time or space to pursue it here, it is interesting to explore the language and 
"metaphors" of conflict resolution across domains to track their sources and etymology, as well as their 
robustness across domains. See, e.g., Victor M. Sergeev, Metaphors for Understanding International 
Negotiation, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, supra note 2, (describing "bargaining," "joint choice," 
and "joint construction of the future" as metaphors that have informed modern international negotia-
tions). 
129. See WORDS OVER WAR, supra note 5, at 9-10. 
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Timing may be everything, but there may also be many entry points, and opportu-
nities to "re-enter" after some failures. What can we learn about "ripeness," 
across domains, to determine when we can nudge the process along and "con-
struct" opportunities for effective resolution and when do we have to wait for the 
parties to force themselves into "hurting stalemates?" Should we be allowed to be 
inactive and guilty bystanders as people kill or hurt each other? When should we 
intrude? 130 
At the other end of the temporal spectrum, the use of "deadlines" is often 
theorized or used descriptively to promote, force, or encourage conflict resolution. 
Whether in the setting of firm trial deadlines,13l or in artificially created deadlines, 
such as George Mitchell's "Easter deadline" in the Northern Ireland peace talks, 132 
critical deadlines or fixed end-dates are often considered a useful way to promote 
final "ripeness." Ironically, I find this one of the most interesting and contradic-
tory concepts in conflict resolution studies. While George Mitchell credits the 
Easter deadline (agreed to by all the parties, he says, because they wanted agree-
ment) as facilitating an end to a multi-year negotiation process, and a multi-
decade (if not multi-century) dispute, President Clinton's efforts a few years later 
to neate deadlines with the expiration of his own term in office (and the Israeli 
election that cost Barak his job) failed to bring a peace agreement to the Mideast, 
even though, allegedly both parties wanted to make an agreement there toO. 133 
So, it is not that deadlines or ripeness always have predicted or desirable ef-
fects. The more interesting questions for study are under what conditions can 
deadlines or other limiting events produce agreements and under what conditions 
can speeding a process along actually .hurt a negotiation process? Have we 
learned anything generalizable about the timing and life-course of disputes or is 
this one of those areas, as I suspect it is, that is deeply contextual and dependent 
on histories and personalities of the parties, as well as of the interveners. Unlike 
most lawsuits and most domestic disputes, international disputes, especially long 
ones, will have many changes of personnel, whether through elective processes, 
other succession processes, or changes of regimes and leadership. The issues of 
"timing" are not severable from the people involved. Unlike propositions of 
physical science, I doubt whether we will ever have generalizable principles about 
the timing of disputes. It is not "chaos theory" or "relativity," but neither is it 
"gravity." As I tum next to some issues of personnel in conflict resolution, you 
might pick your own favorite "concepts" of conflict resolution and ask how well 
the theory behind those "concepts" has been developed across domains. 
130. This of course implicates both the domestic ethical problems explored in the aftermath of the 
Kitty Genovese killing and the study of "prosocial" psychology, as well as the now active field of 
humanitarian intervention in the international relations field. See ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES 
(Jane Stromseth ed., 2003); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane 
eds., 2003). 
131. See MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964). 
132. See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 143-46. 
133. Of course, insiders in that negotiation now say both parties were not really serious about reach-
ing agreement, with blame being placed on both sides. See Malley & Agha, supra note 5; DENNIS 
Ross, THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE (forthcoming). 
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VI. PEOPLE IN CONFLICTS 
Whatever one thinks about the conceptual maps elaborated above to describe 
conflict resolution processes, dispute resolution and negotiation are enacted by 
people who execute behaviors, whether systematically "framed" by schemas or 
models or not. 134 Actors in negotiation and conflict resolution activities can be 
individuals, agents, or representatives for others, groups, organizations, diplomats, 
leaders, or "ad hoc" negotiators (e.g. hostage takers and terrorists). For those of 
us who study conflict resolution, we are likely to at least try to employ one model 
or other. Others, particularly those not exposed to conflict resolution theory, may 
act from "default" perspectives set by role (assumptions of competition for law-
yers and economists; helping or altruistic behavior for social workers, nurses, or 
clergy) or "culture,,135 (the 'set of rules, expectations, and solutions to problems so 
deeply ingrained, it may feel like water to a fish, or air to humans). The people 
who enact conflict resolution are the ones who "mess up" the theory, failing to 
conform to the structures and pictures of our "rational" selves, or selves needing 
categories. Thus, in addition to considering how the actors differ in different con-
texts, such as direct negotiations, bilateral dispute resolution, representative or 
multi-lateral negotiations, family disputes, complex international diplomatic dis-
putes, or international business investment or ventures, we must consider whether 
the great variety of human behavior can in fact be boxed in by theories of behav-
ior that may be "culturally" specific. By "cultural" I do not mean only the crass 
and "monolithic" descriptions of national, ethnic, or religious culture ("do as the 
Romans, Chinese, Japanese, Americans, Arabs, or Israelis do," though the studies 
of such "national character" variations continue to proliferate, in business schools, 
as well as in practical "how to negotiate" guides), but the "professional cultures" 
that develop as well ("cosmopolitan," "international diplomatic," "legal profes-
sional," and even "negotiation" culture).136 How do the people in conflict proc-
esses affect what is possible? 
134. Remember that so much of the work of modern cognitive and social psychology is to demon-
strate departures from "rational" behavior. I have always thought that with most people who act, from 
many different motives, the more interesting question to explain is when people conform to "rational" 
modeling behavior. I prefer the question which asks, "How do people behave?" (descriptively), rather 
than assuming deviation from some social scientist's assumption of "rationality." 
135. For a more useful exposition of "post-modern" understandings of culture, see AVRUCH, 
CULTURE, supra note 2. For a more stilted and somewhat discredited view of "cultural" determinants 
of negotiation behavior, see BRETT, supra note 12; Stephen E. Weiss, Negotiating with "Romans" -
Part I, SLOAN MGM'T REV., Winter 1994, at 51; Stephen E. Weiss, Negotiating with "Romans" - ParI 
2. SLOAN MGM'T REV., Spring 1994, at 85. See also Jeswald W. Salacuse, Intercultural Negotiation 
in International Business, 8 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 217 (1999). 
136. With the growing numbers of foreign students in American business, law, and public policy 
schools, exposed to "our" modern negotiation theory, an international class of "problem-solving nego-
tiators" is being created. Thus, Jeff Rubin, among others, who has trained such students has suggested 
that when we ask about the cultural inputs into conflict resolution behaviors we need to ask, "what 
culture" is affecting behavior and "under what conditions does what culture become salient?". See 
GUY-OUVIER FAURE & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, CULTURE AND NEGOTIATION (1993); Jeffrey Z. Rubin & 
Frank E.A. Sander, Culture. Negotiation and the Eye of the Beholder. 7 NEGOTIATION J. 249 (1991). 
See also Guy-Olivier Faure, International Negotiation: The Cultural Dimension, in INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATION, supra note 2, at 392. Contrast this work to efforts to describe issues of "culture" and 
"diversity" or "racism" in more domestic treatments of conflict resolution. See, e.g.. Howard Gadlin, 
Conflict Resolution. Cultural Differences and the Culture of RacL~m. 10 NEGOTIATION J. 33 (1994); 
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As indicated above, although focus on third party interventions in disputes 
began in international relations (consider our study of all the great diplomatic 
treaties and the roles of Machiavelli, Metternich, Talleyrand, Nicolson, Chamber-
lain, Kissinger, Carter, George Mitchell, Kofi Annen, Ralph Bunch as interna-
tional interveners), study of and classifications of third party activity seems far 
more advanced in domestic conflict resolution theory. With the sophisticated 
debates about "evaluative" vs. "facilitative" mediationl37 and whether "neutral-
ity," "embedded expertise," or legal training is required of third party neutrals 
(whether mediators, arbitrators, facilitators or leaders of public policy consensus 
processes), the "professionalization" of the role of the third party has led to a ro-
bust set of issues for consideration in the practice of third party intervention. In 
the international arena, by contrast, although there are many sophisticated practi-
tioners with diplomatic portfolios, other qualifications such as education, training 
on issues of neutrality, practice protocols, and ethics, seem relatively newer and 
underdeveloped. 138 
Indeed, for all of the successes or "failures" of modem international diplo-
matic negotiation (peace, trade agreements, the European Union, NAFT A, Merco-
sur, the Mideast, South and Latin America), the action appears to be with the 
NGOs, or creative academic theorists or practitioners, developing new approaches 
to conflict resolution, outside the formal models of international relations and 
diplomacy, such as "problem solving workshops," "public peace processes," and 
reconciliation conferences, etc. (consider Harold Saunders, John Paul Lederach,139 
John Burton, Kenneth and Elise Boulding, and Johan Galtung, just to name a 
few). 140 
Thus, systematic study of successful conflict resolution processes requires us 
to examine the individual sources of innovation, which for a newly developing 
field, may occur outside of the formal channels of both theory building (universi-
ties) and practice (formal state institutions in both the international and national 
contexts). In my view, we have yet to capture useful and generalizable principles 
THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER, supra note 102; Isabelle Gunning, Diversity Issues in Media-
tion: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DlsP. RESOL. 55. 
137. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid 
for the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 24-50 (1996). 
138. I do not mean to minimize the work of Jimmy Carter in Haiti, Camp David, or North Korea, or 
George Mitchell in Northern Ireland or any of the other distinguished "helpers" in the Mideast, but 
whenever I read reports or memoirs of these events (including the now emerging reports of the Clinton 
administration efforts in the Mideast), I am always startled by how little attention is paid or thought 
given to all of the theories, models, structures, and concepts of conflict resolution discussed above. 
Just what are they studying in the State Department? International relations and diplomatic schools, 
like Tufts University, have been teaching these principles, but the era of the "amateur" diplomat (see 
KAZuO ISHIGURO, THE REMAINS OF THE DAY 123 (1989)) seems far from being over. I have been 
struck by listening to reports of the "Great Negotiators" (an award now given by the Harvard Program 
on Negotiation each year) how devoid of references to "our" theory their reports are. Good academic 
synthesizers, like James Sebenius, Howard Raiffa, Roger Fisher, or Robert Mnookin, can draw out 
theoretical generalizations, but often practitioners do not speak the language of theory. Gatherings of 
domestic mediators, on the other hand, are noted for their debates about models, theories, frameworks, 
and competing techniques. Is there a difference in domestic and international conceptualization of the 
third party role? And if so, why? 
139. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE (1997). 
140. See Louis Kriesberg, Varieties of Mediating Activities and Mediators in International Relations, 
in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 2, at 219-34. 
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from the "peace stories" told in the case studies and memoirs of participants, 
whether as negotiators, activists, victims, participants, or third party interveners. 141 
Useful points of comparison here are the obvious differences in the use of 
"interested" neutrals with "muscle" or power in international matters and the ide-
ology, and in some cases, requirements of "neutrality" in domestic settings. 142 
VII. AL TERNA TIVES TO CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION? 
Perhaps the most salient factor distinguishing domestic from international 
conflict resolution is the backdrop of the "rule of law" or "violence" as "alterna-
tives" to consensual settlements of disputes. As negotiation theory now asks us to 
map BA TNAs, W A TNAs, and A TNAs, it is particularly important to explore how 
the influence of courts and enforcement institutions-or the lack thereof-affect 
the conduct of consensual bargaining and conflict resolution. While legal en-
forcement is not available to all domestic disputants because of economics or 
access to justice and lawyers, the question of the importance of the "role of law" 
as a measure of fairness in litigation disputes, policy formation, resource alloca-
tion, and transactional matters is now raised in a variety of both practice and the-
ory contexts. 143 
International relations scholars, both political scientists and lawyers, have fo-
cused on the growing diversity of enforcement mechanisms in the international 
arena such as trade sanctions, economic sanctions, broadening standing for private 
enforcement of both trade and human rights violations, censorship, peacekeeping 
forces, humanitarian interventions, and all-out war. 144 Whether this growing 
menu of sanctioning possibilities has further "legalized" the international order 
without a global court or effective enforcement mechanism (especially in light of 
recent "non-state" and "unsanctioned" U.S. unilateral actions) remains to be seen, 
but here some important studies of comparison to domestic settings might be ap-
propriate. Who participates in conflicts? Those given formal "standing" by a 
legal authority, stakeholders, or those who threaten physical or economic security 
141. In my view the most elaborated field is that of domestic consensus building in public policy and 
environmental disputes. See BACOW & WHEELER, supra note 5; BINGHAM, supra note 5; THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 5. We are just beginning to have some reports of 
mediation and settlements of major litigation class actions. See also STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT 
JUSTICE (2003) (discussing Holocaust litigation against Swiss and German banks and companies); 
PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986). 
142. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Proc-
esses: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949 (2002) (reviewing increasing 
regulation of neutrality and conflicts of interests issues in domestic and international arbitration); see 
also MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL (developed by CPR-Georgetown 
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR 2002), available at http://www.cpradr.org (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2003). 
143. See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute 
Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. I (1992); Robert Condlin, Cases on Both Sides: Paltems of Argu-
ment in Legal Dispute Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65 (1985); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 
YALE L. J. 1073 (1984); Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator 
Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation 
and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 47 (1996); Lawrence Susskind, Environ-
mental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. I (1981). 
144. See ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES, supra note 130; HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra 
note 130; Schneider, supra note II. 
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or well-being from inside or from outside? Who intervenes? Self-appointed me-
diators, formally authorized actors (e.g. UN mediators, peacekeeping forces, 
weapons inspectors, court-appointed mediators or arbitrators, privately chosen 
third party neutrals)? What are the criteria used to intervene to try to settle or 
resolve disputes? What is the role offormallaw? Is it custom? Is it power (mili-
tary, economic, or political)? On what basis are agreements crafted (partial, com-
prehensive, contingent, permanent, trades, compromises)? What monitoring, 
enforcement is established?145 Who is affected by outcomes or agreements 
reached (or not)? How do third parties affect the consequent or resulting situation 
(e.g. refugees, "ethnic cleansing," minorities, etc.)? How are non-formal en-
forcement mechanisms created (e.g. coalitions, multi-lateral actions, reconciliation 
or redistributive proceedings)? How do changing actors (new leaders, whether 
elected or otherwise) change the environment? How "interdependent" are parties 
on each other? How do multiple issues impact particular negotiations? What 
"linkages" are made or forced, (e.g., what "trades" occur on such issues as nuclear 
proliferation, economic aid, democratization)? While there are many problems of 
unit and level analysis here, it seems particularly useful to examine how different 
kinds of "alternatives" to conflict resolution mechanisms operate in different 
spheres. 
Does the ultimate sanction of "the rule of law" or court decision affect do-
mestic dispute resolution differently than "violence" or economic sanctions affect 
international disputes? What role does compliance or reputation play in both do-
mains? Has the relative increase of formal international organizations (the Inter-
national Criminal Court, the War Crimes Courts, or the WTO) affected compli-
ance with both formal rules, norms, and less formal customs? Does a proliferation 
of dispute resolution mechanisms help bring order, peace, and justice, or, does it 
permit more strategic "gaming" or movement from one forum to another? 
VIII. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: ARE THERE MORE 
CORRESPONDENCES OR MORE CONTRADICTIONS? 
I am an optimistic person, committed to both justice and peace, to equality 
and democracy, and most importantly to human survival and flourishing. 146 The 
last few decades of the development of the field of conflict resolution, in law, 
business, policy, and other schools, in its interdisciplinary nature and in its prac-
tice, have been particularly exciting for all of us who have contributed ideas and 
hard work. I am a great admirer of grand theory and the hopes for "systematic,,147 
approaches to conflict study which aim for some universal "acontextuality" across 
a variety of domains. Yet, I know that even from the beginning of my own work 
in legal negotiations, I saw the differences in litigation and transactional negotia-
tions. I even suggested a list of "contextual" factors early on that I thought would 
affect how negotiations were conducted and which of several negotiation "orient-
145. See Arild Underdal, The Outcomes oJNegotiation, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, supra note 
2, at 110. 
146. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests oj Justice" in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: Pursuing Peace as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761 (2002). 
147. See Howard Raiffa, Contributions oj Applied Systems Analysis to International Negotiation, in 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION, supra note 2, at 5. 
HeinOnline -- 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 350 2003
350 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2003 
ing frameworks" would have to be chosen in those different contexts. 148 Perhaps I 
am a product of my mid-to-late twentieth century education, influenced by sociol-
ogy, feminism, epistemology, post-modernism (and modernism before it), and 
common law legal reasoning, but to me facts matter, conditions differ, and very 
few "grand" and "meta-theories" in the social sciences and law have fully stood 
the test of time, 149 especially as we have come to ask who are the creators of the-
ory and what are their purposes?150 While I continue to admire those who attempt 
to create "acontextual" theory in our field (now focused on elaborating the differ-
ences between bi-lateral and multi-lateral negotiation),151 applying economic, 
mathematical, or even psychological models to human decision making, I can't 
help but think, especially in light of current events (and many actors, including 
terrorists committed to fundamentally different belief systems, as well as our own 
leaders, who seem equally insensitive to global well-being), that human conflict 
makers and conflict resolvers will not easily be "contained" in universal boxes or 
categories. Because I think these things, I offer the following suggestions for 
future "contextualized" studies for moving our field productively along, in theory 
and in practice, with the hope that even without universal theories we can learn 
more about how to prevent deadly and dangerous conflict and violence: 
1. Under what social, political, cultural, and economic conditions do 
particular forms of conflict resolution (adversarial, competitive, violent 
or collaborative, cooperative, and problem solving) emerge? 
2. What kinds of interventions/actors/circumstances change the course, 
scope, or method of conflict resolution? 
3. What kinds of circumstances require different forms of conflict reso-
lution activities? (e.g., how does "short-term" violence prevention or 
amelioration differ from longer term reconciliation and relationship-
developing action)? 
4. What roles can "insiders" (stakeholder participants) to a conflict 
play? 
5. What roles can "outsiders" ("interested parties," "affected parties," or 
"neutral parties") to a conflict play? 
6. How does the locus (familial, local, national, cultural, intercultural, 
international) of the conflict affect the possible processes and outcomes 
that are available (a form of "level" or unit of analysis "reality testing")? 
148. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 905-37. 
149. Indeed, our Constitution, flawed from the beginning with its toleration of slavery, has "lasted" 
only because of a Civil War (violence), many amendments (legislative and constitutional "dispute 
resolution and negotiation") and always changing interpretation ("post-modernism" and hermeneutics). 
150. See SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? (1991). 
151. See Howard Raiffa, LECTURES ON NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS (1997). 
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7. How much commitment to similar goals, "world views," values, or 
processes,152 is required to create a "conflict resolution" process? 
8. How can we develop structures, concepts, and languages that are pro-
tean enough to have explanatory purchase across domains, but "open" 
enough to be studied and examined across levels of disputing and con-
flicts? 
9. What varieties of interventions and dispute processing are possible 
and how are they related to each other (sequencing, series, continuing, 
multiple or parallel tracks)? 153 
10. How can dispute processes be "elicited" from those in dispute l54 
(rather than "laid down" by those outside or "on top" of a dispute)? 
II. What kinds of dispute or conflict resolution processes can be "institu-
tionalized"? Which work better when maintained in "ad hoc," flexible 
forms? 
12. What is the relation of formal "international relations" or "civil or 
criminal litigation" (state-based processes) theory and practices to more 
informal, flexible, and ad hoc processes or institutions (NGOs, "problem-
solving workshops," etc.)? How much multiple level action is benefi-
cial/tolerable and how much leads to difficulties of coordination? 
351 
I want to end by suggesting that although I am skeptical that we will develop 
a fully universal theory of conflict resolution, I am optimistic to think that we will 
actually learn something useful by examining our concepts across levels, and ac-
cumulating more "incremental knowledge,,,155 perhaps by rigorously exploring 
differences in contexts, rather than assumptions of sameness, uniformity, homo-
geneity of, or translatability across units of analysis. 
If "third party intervention" and "deadline" setting or "ripeness" look differ-
ent in different contexts we will have learned something. Lawsuits, even the 
152. Compare STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000) (opining that since we will never 
have agreement on substantive human goods and goals, the most we can hope for is some agreement 
on procedural fairness for resolving conflict) with Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation is Not the 
Only Way: Consensus Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL'y 37 (2002) (giving author's commentary on JUSTICE IS CONFLICT). I am no longer sure whether 
we are any more likely to agree to procedural goals than substantive ones. Even Hampshire, whose 
work I admire, "universalizes" a belief in Anglo-American "adversary argument" (audi alteram par-
tem-"hear the other side") as the best procedure by which to resolve human conflicts. 
153. See Harold H. Saunders, Prenegoiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Multilevel Peace 
Process, in TURBULENT PEACE, supra note 5, at 483. 
154. See LEDERACH, supra note 13. 
155. From my own experience, I can attest that my mediation retainer agreement has expanded over 
the years to more than fifteen single-spaced pages because I learn something from each new case I take 
and add refinements to the explanations, promises, representations, and covenants I make with parties 
in mediation. My resistance to a single "form" retainer agreement is similar to my distaste for grand 
theory, boilerplate clauses, and "off the shelf' training programs. Like my retainer agreements, every 
training in dispute resolution I do is tailor-made for the clients in each particular setting. 
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longest ones, usually settle more quickly than centuries of inter-racial or inter-
ethnic conflict. The threat of an authoritative decision maker may hasten volun-
tary settlement over situations where there is no enforcing authority, but agree-
ments reached consensually when there is no outside threat of decision may be 
longer-lasting and more easily complied with. Learning to live with differences 
within national boundaries or regional trade zones may provide a variety of "ex-
emplars" for different modes of co-existence. If we are truly looking for "solu-
tions" to domestic and international conflicts, disputes, and problems, than we 
should be open to as many different and contextually specific ideas as it will take. 
Though I doubt that there is a single theory to fit all human problems for decision, 
I think we can get better at it by "comparing and contrasting" specifics, rather than 
assuming uniformity or generality. I urge you to find your favorite conflict reso-
lution idea, model, or concept and try it out in a few different places. Our theory 
and our practice will be all the richer and deeper for it. 
